

25X1A
25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP89B00569R000400050073-6

12 NOV 59 TOP SECRET

ORIG: [REDACTED]
UNIT: OPS/DPD
EXT: [REDACTED]
DATE: 12 NOVEMBER 1959

TOP SECRET

ROUTING			
1	OPS/DPD	4	A/C/DPD
2	[REDACTED]	5	RI/DPD
3	DD/P	6	OPS

TO: [REDACTED] 25X1A

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DPD (1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10) TOP SECRET

INFO: S/C (11)

FQ

25X1A TOR: 2156Z 12 NOV 59

25X1A

OUT54932

TO: [REDACTED] INFO

CITE [REDACTED]

4199

25X1A

25X1A

EYES ONLY [REDACTED]

REF: [REDACTED] 0675 (IN 11181)

25X1A

25X1A

1. YOUR REF PARA ONE IS GENERALLY AGREED. IT IS HQS POLICY, HOWEVER, THAT TWO ALTERNATIVE FLIGHT PLANS FOR [REDACTED] DECISION SHOULD BE AVOIDED. IN THIS RESPECT HQS CONFIDENT THAT [REDACTED] WX FORECAST SHOULD BE GOOD ENOUGH TO DETERMINE WHETHER KAZAN OPEN OR NOT AND ACCORDINGLY FEEL THAT DECISION AS TO FINAL ROUTE CHOICE SHOULD BE MADE BY THIS HQS AT THIS TIME. NATURALLY THE STAGING WILL NOT BE SET IN MOTION UNLESS THERE IS EVERY CHANCE THAT THE PRIORITY ONE ROUTE WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED AND, THEREFORE, THE QUESTION OF DECISION SHOULD ONLY ARISE IF THERE IS AN UNEXPECTED AND MAJOR WX CHANGE AT THE LATER TIME WITH NO HOPE OF KAZAN BEING CLEAR. IN EVENT WE PROGRESS FOR 2 OR 3 WEEKS WITH LITTLE CHANCE OF KAZAN BECOMING OPEN SUGGEST YOU ADVISE US WHEN YOU CONSIDER THE WAITING PERIOD IS UP AND WE SHOULD GO FOR THE ALTERNATIVE AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY. TO ASSIST WE WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED ON WX SITUATION AND TENDENCIES DURING ANY SUCH PERIOD.

2. HQS INTELLIGENCE REFS HAVE STRONG FEELINGS THAT FORT SHEVCHENKO

COORDINATING OFFICERS

TOP SECRET

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICE

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ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

ROUTING

1	2000400050073-6
2	5
3	6

TO :
FROM :
CONF :
INFO :

TOP SECRET

P R O C E D U R E	DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

PAGE TWO

TO

INFO

CITE

SHOULD BE COVERED IF AT ALL POSSIBLE ON THE ALTERNATIVE ROUTE. REASON BEING THAT THIS AREA IMPORTANT PART OF KAPUSTIN YAR COMPLEX. NO OBJECTION, HOWEVER, TO OMITTING ASTRAKAN ALTHOUGH IF PORT SHEVCHENKO IS GOING TO BE COVERED, SUCH OMISSION WOULD SAVE LITTLE RANGE AND, THEREFORE, MIGHT AS WELL BE INCLUDED. WITH REGARD PARA 2, HQS OPINION IS THAT WHICHEVER EXIT BREAK-OFF POINT IS SELECTED REACTION WOULD BE THE SAME; ONLY ADVANTAGE BEING THAT LESS TIME WOULD BE SPENT OVER [] TERRITORY.

3. TO ASSIST FORWARD PLANNING, WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR DECISIONS ON ABOVE AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND ALSO INFO ON LIKELY DATE OF [] SUBMISSION TO [].

END OF MESSAGE

C/OPS/DPD

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM BURKE
A/C/DPD
RELEASING OFFICER

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